From Tuomas Malinen’s Forecasting Newsletter.
In this piece I present four scenarios for the ‘endgame’ to the Russo-Ukrainian war. They are:
The overruling majority (peace).
The immovable majority (wider war).
Regime change in Russia (risky conflict).
World War III (nuclear holocaust).
Scenarios concentrate on the drivers of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, or NATO. More precisely, they deal with whether NATO is being driven by simply erratic decisions, or whether it’s an aggressor. I went through these basic scenarios in length in my last entry.
I have not visited Russia since 2011. I made this decision after the annexation of Crimea. I don’t think that wars of invasion should be allowed in modern Europe. Yet, I’ve visited Russia, and even the Soviet Union, many times. My relatives were working at the Finnish embassies in Russia, which led me and my mother to visit the Soviet Union two times, when I was just a kid. The visions of a chaotic Soviet Moscow have been burned into my memory for the rest of my life.
In 2009, we went to Moscow with a group of family and friends. The theme of the few day trip became nje rabotaet, which essentially means “it does not work”. This was because nothing seemed to work, and everyone kept telling us that phrase (in metro stations, bars, cafeterias, etc.). Russia is a chaotic, but funny place. Slavic people are not actually known for their exuberant niceness, but you do get help in Russia, when you ask for it.
The leadership of a country naturally often tends to mimic the culture and national characteristics. The spontaneous actions of the current Russian leader President Putin are not anomalies in their history. Many Russian leaders from Ivan the Terrible to Char Peter I and further to Stalin and other leaders of the Soviet Union have fought invasive wars and acted very reactively.
In my view, the demonization of Russia arises mainly from two sources:
People do not understand Russia, and thus fear it, and
War propaganda.
This piece essentially deals with both. First, I go through the Finnish experience with Russia, which should act as a comforting lesson for the rest of the world, and how it applies to the current situation in Europe. Then, I will present four scenarios for the endgame of the Russo-Ukrainian war.
The Finnish experience
Finns fought two wars against Russia, more precisely against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was, or it became a military behemoth during WWII. It has been said that before Operation Barbarossa, for example, the air force of the Soviet Union was larger than that of the rest of world. The purge of the Red Amy, by then-dictator of Russia Josif Stalin in 1937, reduced the morale and efficiency of Soviet military right before the onset of WWII. This was visible in the Winter War fought between Finland and the Soviet Union between 30th November 1939 and 13th March 1940. The Finnish seriously unequipped military inflicted devastating losses on the Red Army almost solely with ‘Sisu’. After the Finnish troops had stopped all progress of an over-whelming Russian invasion force at the end of December, Soviet high command went into re-thinking and re-grouping mode. On February 1st 1940, the Red Army started its crushing attack against an already stretched Finnish defenders. Heroic resistance of the Finnish soldiers and growing international pressure saved Finland, while she lost some 12% of her landmass.
Wars between Russia and Finland did not end with the Winter War, because Finland took part to Operation Barbarossa as an unofficial ally to Nazi Germany. An excerpt from my Finland and NATO piece in the Epoch Times:
The Winter War was largely bilateral, caused by territorial claims of the then-leader of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, and the secret amendment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact placing Finland under the Soviet “sphere of influence.” The Continuation War was fought alongside Nazi Germany in an effort to reclaim territories lost in the Winter War. Finland actually had very little choice under the constraints created by the ongoing European war. There was a constant threat of a Soviet invasion, and Finland held the largest known nickel deposit in Europe in Petsamo, the northern “arm” of Finland, which both Hitler and Stalin sought to command. It thus had to either join forces with Germany or face a possible new Soviet invasion. The wars resulted in the loss of around 12 percent of Finland’s territory, including Petsamo.
After the wars, Presidents Juho Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen formulated a policy line of passive neutrality called the Paasikivi–Kekkonen doctrine. It was based on the “fear factor” Finland acquired during the two wars and friendly co-existence. While Finland lost 12% of her landmass, we earned our right to co-exist, independent, during the Cold War right next to the most formidable military power the world had ever seen.
Finns also understood that you should not poke the Russian bear. While she may seem vulnerable and weak, she’s not, and will become much more dangerous if wounded. I don’t think we will ever know for sure, why Stalin spared Finland after the Moscow Armistice after the Continuation War, but we know why the relationship with Russia (Soviet Union) later became so prosperous and friendly, which brings us to the current problem Europe faces.
The problem of Europe
The Russian mindset is not so complex or chaotic as many in the West make it to be. Like I explained in my previous entry, Russian leadership seeks to increase its influence in the neighboring regions driven by bezopasnost. They also follow strength instead of diplomacy. Finland cemented her position beside the Soviet Union by not making herself a threat and making herself strong both economically and militarily (that is, a very ‘bitter pill’ for Russia to swallow). So, the success of Finland to coexist and prosper alongside Russia (Soviet Union) was based on strength and keeping friendly relations with Moscow. Easy recipe.
The problem Europe now faces is two-fold. First, after Finland became a full member of the NATO, Russia has been cornered from every side in Europe by a force it does not consider peaceful, which is something we really cannot blame the Russian leadership from. Previous Finnish leaders knew that if Finland makes herself a threat to Russia, consequences will be dire. Ukrainian leadership must have known this too, but they were clearly manipulated by western leaders. Secondly, we can now conclude that NATO is not what it says it is.
The future of Europe now basically hangs in the balance between two dangerous scenarios of what is actually driving NATO, which can be categorized as:
NATO, the erratic, and
NATO, the aggressor.
These characterizations draw from utterly irresponsible or deliberately aggressive actions taken by NATO leadership over the past three decades and especially during the past year. You can simplify this by stating that either NATO leadership massively underestimated Russian resources and the devotion of her leadership to bezopasnost or then they deliberately over-stepped the red lines of Moscow in an effort to create a military conflict that would engulf Europe.
In what follows, I sketch future scenarios based on the two assumptions of the motives of NATO. They show that the underlying assumptions (erratic or aggressive NATO), dominates the future paths of Europe, and the world, while three of the four scenarios may end up in the same terrifying end-result, that is, a nuclear holocaust. Scenarios are behind a paywall, but you can read them through the 7-day free trial.
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