On nuclear deterrence

Daily Thoughts 6 Mar 2025

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After the ascension of Finland to the full membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, Finnish politicians floated the idea of Finland relinquishing the Nuke-Free Nordics policy. I needed to educate them a bit.

Yesterday, President of France, Emmanuel Macron, opened up a similar debate on providing the French nuclear deterrence to the entirety of the EU. This would be done in preparation for the “Russian threat”. This is a major topic, and I may write more on this in depth tomorrow or during the weekend, but now I want to raise one point.

On May 30, we issueda warning on the possibility of a nuclear strike in Europe. It was based on the strikes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) on the Russian early-warning system (over-the-horizon radars) operating in Krasnodar Krai and in Orenburg region (some 1500 km from Ukraine). We noted:

Nuclear deterrence operates on three dimensions: time, distance and altitude, in addition to the actual arsenal of nuclear weapons. Time and distance are crucial for the response (retaliation, effectively) and altitude where missiles fly, is crucial for anti-missile and other defense systems to operate. Over-the-horizon radars are crucial for all three dimensions, as early warnings give authorities time, distance and altitude to react and enact defensive measures. If they are taken out, or their ability to detect an approaching intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) seriously hindered, modern nuclear deterrence simply fails. This is the reason, why Kremlin would be forced to react if the early-warning system of Russia would become compromised by a foreign party (Ukraine/NATO). This applies also to the U.S. and all other nuclear powers. Everybody would eventually be forced to react under such a threat.

What would the proposal of President Macron entail?