Before the “ink” was barely dry in my previous piece, escalation in the Middle East resumed. Iran downed an U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter over the Strait of Hormuz (and reportedly hit others). There are reports stating that the helicopters would have attacked the Iranian speed boats patrolling the area, which would have returned to fire.
As a (tragi-)comical twist, the U.S. Central Command first noted that the Apache simply crashed. I learned early in the conflict that the Iranian army and press are more trustworthy than the U.S. ones. Quite a twist.
The U.S. “retaliated” by striking several locations in Iran, which included two water storage units in the Bemani District in Sirik Province. This is essentially a war crime, but who cares when it is the U.S. or Israel doing it, right?
Iran responded by striking the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain, the U.S. Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, and the U.S. Airbase Muwaffaq Salti in Jordan with missiles and drones. The U.S. naturally argued that all missiles would have been intercepted, but videos on hits and reported explosions on all sites have already emerged. There are reports of major explosions, e.g., from Bahrain. So, most likely, Iran managed direct hits. Some claim that no sirens heard in Bahrain, which would imply that there was no warning on the troops there either.
Iran had threatened Jordan on Sunday evening/night that if they continued to intercept Iranian drones and missiles, they would come under attack. Last night, they made good on their promise. Hence, the war is even more regional.
Now, the question is, what will the U.S. do? Will the U.S. strike back, fully aware that such action could plunge the region into another full-scale conflict? In the Play of the IRGC II, I noted that
President Trump is both “groveling” before Tehran to secure a ceasefire extension and simultaneously planning for further military action. He likely wants to see a ceasefire extension before the World Cup begins or, and most pressingly, before oil and fuel shortages emerge, crashing his presidency, which is expected to happen sometime between July and September. At the same time, however, he’s preparing for means to launch a ground invasion into Iran. This is visible, e.g., from the strikes Iran has made on Kurdish rebels both near the border with Turkey and within Iraq.
This is the tactic of President Trump, which he has followed for a long time. He appears docile and even submissive, but he is constantly searching for weak spots in his opponent to target. He is a cunning adversary in all kinds of negotiations. What has changed recently, though, is that he has become malevolent, which he was not before. Without going into any deeper into this, such a change in personality is one of the symptoms of frontotemporal dementia.1
Moreover, empires do “not go gently into that good night”. If they begin to lose ground, as the U.S. has now, they will fight to regain it until the very end (so to speak). Hence, both the U.S. and Iran are on a threshold.
Iran had the element of surprise in the 12-Day and Ramadan Wars. The element of surprise is now gone. It carries two central implications.
