A (reverse) David vs. Goliath
Part I: The strike capabilities of Iran vs. Israel in a game of nuclear exchange
This week, I’ve been modeling the possible nuclear escalation between Israel and Iran. I have to say that it has been rather intriguing. The setup of the “game” is far from normal because of the differences the countries hold in their strike capabilities, size, and vulnerabilities, which significantly affect the strategic calculations and potential outcomes of nuclear escalation between Israel and Iran.
I used my previous modeling of the nuclear exchange between a nuclear-capable state and a non-nuclear proxy for a nuclear-capable state as a starting point. The (preliminary) modeling presented a clear path of nuclear escalation between Israel and Iran, with initial conditions and commitment of the non-nuclear party determining the end-result of the game.
I will now present the preliminary findings of my modeling alongside some updates from the war in two consecutive pieces. I urge you to read The changing nature of nuclear deterrence as a primer.
